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Leverage Is Everything:
Understanding the Trump
Administration’s Linkage between
Trade Agreements and
Unilateral Import Restrictions
Richard O. Cunningham *
This paper offers an understanding of the Trump
administration’s (Administration) often-perplexing approach to
international
trade
policy
and,
in
particular,
the
Administration’s repeated threats to withdraw from or
renegotiate bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements.
The central premise offered here is that all Administration trade
actions—including both its approach to trade agreements and its
threats or use of unilateral import restrictions—must be seen in
terms of two fundamental goals. The first is to eliminate U.S.
trade deficits with foreign countries (individually or collectively).
The second is to restore the U.S. manufacturing sector by
limiting imports and by bringing back to the U.S. manufacturing
that had been moved to other countries. Renegotiation of trade
agreements and imposition of import restrictions are closely
integrated tactics used to accomplish these goals. Thus, neither
should be seen as an end in itself, but rather as leverage toward
achieving whatever specific goal the Administration seeks at the
time. In one situation, import restrictions (or threat thereof)
may serve as leverage in a trade agreement negotiation. In
another situation, a trade negotiation may be conducted in a
manner that provides leverage to obtain a limitation of imports.
In analyzing this approach to trade, this paper addresses the
following: A brief summary of the Trump Administration’s trade
policy and objectives; specific examples of the Administration’s
leverage-based strategy in action; and more detailed discussions
of the Administration’s leverage strategies in the three most
important areas of U.S. trade today: US-China trade, the effort
either to change or withdraw from the World Trade
Organization, and the attempt to reshape the structure of North
America by renegotiating or withdrawing from the North
American Free Trade Agreement.

*

Senior International Trade Partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP. This paper
is an adaption of a presentation made at the Frederick K. Cox International
Law Center Conference on “International Law & Policy in the Age of
Trump” Cleveland, Ohio on September 14, 2018.
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I.

The Trade Objectives and Strategies of the
Trump Administration

Donald J. Trump was elected President of the United States,
largely because of an angry feeling on the part of a substantial
segment of the American electorate that the globalization of the U.S.
economy has enriched sophisticated, cosmopolitan East and West
Coast Americans while leaving them behind. 1 The Trump campaign
relentlessly complained that “bad trade agreements” 2 have permitted
rising volumes of imports and have facilitated the movement of U.S.
manufacturing operations offshore—thus depriving U.S. workers of
good jobs in the manufacturing sector. 3
It is important to note that this argument did not target, nor did
it appeal to, a majority of Americans. Remember that Hillary
Clinton received nearly three million more votes than Donald Trump. 4
But it struck a chord of resentment in a swath of industrial states
that had historically voted Democratic or are “swing states:”
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin—all of
1.

See Robert Leonard, Opinion, Why Rural America Voted for Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/whyrural-america-voted-for-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/9EV6-GERT]
(discussing the dynamics that led certain Americans to vote for Trump).

2.

MARCUS NOLAND ET. AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., ASSESSING
TRADE AGENDAS IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 23 (2016).

3.

Donald J. Trump, United States 2016 Presidential Election Candidate,
Speech at Alumisource in Monessen, Pennsylvania (June 28, 2016).

4.

Sarah Begley, Hillary Clinton Leads by 2.8 Million in Final Popular Vote
Count, TIME (Dec. 20, 2016), http://time.com/4608555/hillary-clintonpopular-vote-final/ [https://perma.cc/5PB6-XE24].
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which swung for Trump and gave him victory in the electoral college.5
This is the “base” that the President sees (correctly) as the key to
continuation in power of his party, which is now the Trump Party
more than a traditional Republican Party. 6 And he sees maintaining
the allegiance of the base as being dependent on his Administration
making good on the trade promises he made during the campaign.
The Trump Administration therefore has little use for trade
agreements or policies that enhance a rules-based trading system 7 or
that facilitate the development or maintenance of efficient “value
chains” which diversify the international sourcing of production
inputs. 8
This view permeates almost every aspect of the
Administration’s thinking about trade-related issues. For example,
the Administration is hostile to investor-state dispute settlement
provisions in trade agreements 9--not out of concern about the possible
liability of governments, but based on the view that providing a
remedy against unfair actions by host governments would make it
safer for U.S. companies to establish production abroad. 10
Candidate Trump, in keeping with this view of trade, condemned
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 11 and President Trump

5.

Todd Spangler, The Rust Belt Gave Trump Victory, Now They Want Jobs
in Return, USA Tᴏᴅᴀʏ (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/politics/2017/01/18/rust-belt-voters-donald-trump/96670922/
[https://perma.cc/JE9H-58AR].

6.

Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Two Years and Hundreds of Inflammatory Ads Later,
the G.O.P. is the Party of Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/us/politics/republicans-midtermstrump-racial-division.html [https://perma.cc/JE8A-X422].

7.

WAYNE M. MORRISON & ANDRES B. SCHWARZENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., IF11035, MANAGED TRADE AND QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS: ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS (2018).

8.

Id.; see also WTO ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD
(Deborah K. Elms & Patrick Low eds., 2013), https://www.wto.org
/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4tradeglobalvalue13_e.pdf (discussing the
global value chains and the way they shape the international economy).

9.

James McBride, How Are Trade Disputes Resolved?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-are-tradedisputes-resolved [https://perma.cc/2VCW-P4Y3].

10.

See id. (discussing the Trump Administration’s concern with nonAmericans have control over U.S. law with counterarguments that the
current system of investor-trade agreements protects U.S. foreign
investments).

11.

Cristiano Lima, Trump Calls Trade Deal ‘a rape of our country,’ POLITICO
(June 28, 2016, 9:12 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donaldtrump-trans-pacific-partnership-224916 [https://perma.cc/R7LE-UD4E].

51

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Leverage is Everything

withdrew from it. 12 For similar reasons, his Administration essentially
discontinued negotiations with the European Union for a
Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP). 13
He
condemned The WTO as hostile to American interests, and has
recently threatened to “pull the United States out” if the WTO “does
not shape up.” 14 He also characterized the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as “the worst trade deal ever,” and the
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) as “a horrible deal,” and
pledged to either renegotiate or withdraw from them. 15
The Administration has also initiated a series of proceedings
aimed at severely restricting imports of industrial products. 16 Socalled “national security” investigations have been initiated under
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 17 against imports of
steel, aluminum, uranium and autos (including auto parts), and a
further proceeding has been threatened against semiconductor
imports. 18 In addition, a proceeding under Section 301 of the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974 19 against Chinese technology-related practices has

12.

Trump Executive Order Pulls Out of TTP Trade Deal, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38721056 [https://
perma.cc/B6SL-SGG2].

13.

Philip Blenkinsop, U.S. Trade Talks in Deep Freeze After Trump Win,
Says EU, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-election-eu-trade-idUSKBN1361UN [https://perma.cc/23JF-3TJB].

14.

John Micklethwait et al., Trump Threatens to Pull U.S. Out of WTO If It
Doesn’t ‘Shape Up’, Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/trump-says-he-will-pull-u-s-out-of-wto-ifthey-don-t-shape-up [https://perma.cc/Z4HF-TL8L].

15.

Michael Collins, What is NAFTA? Seven Things to Know About the North
American Free Trade Pact, USA TODAY (last updated Aug. 23, 2018, 11:13
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/23/naftaseven-things-you-should-know-free-trade-agreement/1063956002/
[https://perma.cc/B7AT-XB7W]; Philip Rucker, Trump: ‘We May
Terminate’ U.S.-South Korea Trade Agreement, WASH. POST (Apr. 28,
2017), https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-we-may-terminateus-south-korea-trade-agreement/2017/04/27/75ad1218-2bad-11e7-a616d7c8a68c1a66_story.html [https://perma.cc/ATR4-DVTH].

16.

See Trump Directs Commerce to Open Section 232 Investigation of Auto
Imports,
Cᴏᴠɪɴɢᴛᴏɴ
&
Bᴜʀʟɪɴɢ
LLP
(May
24,
2018),
https://www.cov.com//media/files/corporate/publications/2018/05/trump
_directs_commerce_to_open_section_232_investigation_of_auto_import
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS9V-UVF2] (discussing the restrictions on steel
and aluminum imports).

17.

19 U.S.C. §1862.

18.

COVINGTON, supra note 16.

19.

19 U.S.C. §2411.
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resulted in tariffs on $50 billion of Chinese imports, with a specific
threat of tariffs on an additional $200 billion of Chinese imports. 20
It is important to understand two reasons why the Trump
Administration has turned to Sections 232 and 301 as the principal
vehicles for limiting imports. First, unlike such traditional “trade
remedy” laws as the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes21,
Sections 232 and 301 give the President essentially unlimited
flexibility to devise whatever forms and levels of import restriction he
deems appropriate. 22 Thus, these remedies can be adapted to achieve
whatever form and degree of leverage the Administration deems
necessary.
Second, and perhaps more important, impositions of import
restrictions under these laws are discretionary Presidential decisions
that are not appealable to the U.S. courts. 23 Moreover, as to Section
232, it is this Administration’s firm (but quite likely erroneous) view
that a decision to restrict imports cannot be challenged in a WTO
dispute settlement proceeding. 24
It would, in the opinion of this writer, be a mistake to view the
use of these two statutes by the Trump Administration purely in
terms of the stated purposes of those laws – namely the protection of
U.S. national security (Section 232) and removal or amelioration of a
foreign government’s unjustifiable or unreasonable trade practices
(Section 301). Rather, as the case-specific discussions in this paper
will make clear, President Trump sees these proceedings as creating
flexible threats of import restrictions that can be used as powerful
leverage to put pressure on governments to make concessions in trade
negotiations or to change trade (or other) policies in ways demanded
by the United States.
It is often observed that Donald Trump is a “transactional”
president. 25 Nowhere is that more evident than in his approach to
20.

Press Release, Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer
on Section 301 Action (July 10, 2018), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2018/august/statement-us-traderepresentative [https://perma.cc/L8CR-5XU3].

21.

Trade Remedy Laws, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, https://www.usitc.gov/
trade_remedy_laws.htm [https:// perma.cc/HT9H-ASKC].

22.

MARCUS NOLAND ET. AL., supra note 2, at 9-11.

23.

Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §232, 19 U.S.C. §1862 (1964); Cᴏɴɢ.
Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Sᴇʀᴠ., R45249, Sᴇᴄᴛɪᴏɴ 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2018).

24.

Panels Established to Review US Steel and Aluminum Tariffs,
Countermeasures on US Imports, Wᴏʀʟᴅ Tʀᴀᴅᴇ Oʀɢᴀɴɪᴢᴀᴛɪᴏɴ (Nov.
21, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_19nov18
_e.htm [https://perma.cc/GX5J-6N5C].

25.

See, e.g., Robert Costa, Conservatives Now Wonder if Transactional Trump
Might Leave Them in the Cold, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2018),
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international trade. Issues are to be resolved and goals to be achieved
by negotiating a “deal,” 26 he is much less comfortable in negotiating
about rules than he is about negotiating amounts and dollar values,
as he has done in his long career in real estate. 27
In trade agreement negotiations, as well as in enforcement of U.S.
trade laws, President Trump’s strong inclination is to put primary
emphasis on reducing imports into the U.S., rather than reducing or
eliminating foreign barriers to U.S exports. 28 At bottom, his critique
of U.S. trade agreements is that they have opened up U.S. markets to
imports. 29 He quotes George Washington and Abraham Lincoln to
the effect that it is important to protect U.S. industries from import
competition. 30
Underlying President Trump’s trade philosophy is a conviction
that other countries have been “unfair” in trade. 31 In part, this
represents such traditional trade concerns as subsidies, dumping, theft
or forced transfer of U.S. firms’ intellectual property, state
control/guidance of producing enterprises and the like. 32 But his
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/conservatives-now-wonder-iftransactional-trump-might-leave-them-in-the-cold/2018/11/06/09e399c2e118-11e8-ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html?utm_term
=.ddfd8937c77d
[https://perma.cc/S3KL-G3AA] (referring to
President Trump as
“transactional Trump”).
26.

See Philip Rucker & Josh Dawsey, Trump Two Years In: The Dealmaker
Who Can’t Seem to Make a Deal, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-two-years-in-thedealmaker-who-cant-seem-to-make-a-deal/2019/01/20/ecdede96-1bf9-11e988fe-f9f77a3bcb6c_story.html?utm_term
=.edd3cbd63b37
[https://
perma.cc/Y9NM-QU4X] (describing President Trump as a “dealmaker”).

27.

See, e.g., David Nakamura & Seung Min Kim, ‘He’s a Gut Politician’:
Trump’s Go-To Negotiating Tactics Aren’t Working in Shutdown Standoff,
WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hesa-gut-politician-trumps-go-to-negotiating-tactics-not-working-in-shutdownstandoff/2019/01/09/c7bb5ff2-142b-11e9-b6ad9cfd62dbb0a8_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.834e695a59cd
[https://perma.cc/SBU2-SDEJ] (describing President Trump’s negotiating
techniques).

28.

Id.

29.

Binyamin Appelbaum, On Trade, Donald Trump Breaks With 200 Years of
Economic Orthodoxy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes
.com/2016/03/11/us/politics/-trade-donald-trump-breaks-200-yearseconomic-orthodoxy-mercantilism.html [https://perma.cc/AY7V-C6HH].

30.

Donald J. Trump, 2016 Presidential Candidate, Remarks in New York City:
States of the Election (June 22, 2016).

31.

President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies,
THE WHITE HOUSE (May 29, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trump-confronting-chinas-unfair-tradepolicies/ [https://perma.cc/23ML-CYGD].

32.

Id.
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definition of “unfairness” also extends to low wage rates and even to
foreign consumers’ preference for German, Japanese or Korean
automobiles over U.S. cars. 33
One is tempted to conclude that, except as to the
Administration’s efforts to force structural changes in China’s “state
capitalism” (discussed later in this paper), the allegations of
“unfairness” are largely rhetorical and tactical. In most contexts, the
U.S. is not seeking “fairness” for its own sake, but rather alleges
“unfairness” as a justification for the threats of import restrictions
that it uses as leverage to achieve the goals of eliminating bilateral
trade deficits and bringing manufacturing – and jobs – back to the
United States.
Much of President Trump’s approach to trade issues, and
particularly to trade negotiations, is shared by his U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR), Robert Lighthizer. For over a quarter
century, Bob Lighthizer was the lead counsel in antidumping,
countervailing duty, and safeguard cases brought by the American
steel industry. 34 He shares the views that foreign governments
andtheir exporters behave unfairly, that high tariffs are appropriate to
respond to that unfairness and, most importantly for the discussion
herein, that negotiations will not effectively address trade problems
without the leverage provided by the threat that such high tariffs will
be imposed if the foreign party does not agree to U.S. demands. 35 As
Deputy USTR in the Reagan Administration, he negotiated
comprehensive “voluntary” restraint agreements (VRAs) with foreign
governments by threatening the imposition of high tariffs if they did
not agree to quantitative limitations. 36
With these considerations in mind, I turn now to discussions of
how this Administration’s leverage-based trade policy has been
applied in specific negotiations.

33.

See, e.g., Charles Riley, Made in America: The German Cars Trump
Doesn’t
Want,
CNN
(June
12,
2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/11/news/economy/german-cars-trumptrade/index.html [https://perma.cc/U7TS-9ZJV] (describing President
Trump’s statements about foreign consumers’ preference for German cars).

34.

Ana Swanson, The Little-Known Trade Adviser Who Wields Enormous
Power in Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/03/09/us/politics/robert-lighthizer-trade.html
[https://perma.cc/9HWN-PZ7P].

35.

THE WHITE HOUSE supra note 31.

36.

John Burton, Trump Rolls the Dice on China Trade, ASIA TIMESꜱ(Mar. 23,
2018), http://www.atimes.com/article/trump-rolls-dice-china-trade/ [https:
//perma.cc/W27S-Z5LQ].

55

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Leverage is Everything

II. The Use of “National Security” Import
Restrictions as Leverage
Section 232, the “National Security Amendment,” authorizes the
President, pursuant to an investigation and recommendation by the
Department of Commerce, to “adjust” imports and/or to take other
steps where imports of a product threaten to impair the national
security of the United States. 37 The statute enumerates two
alternative bases on which such a threat to national security may be
found:
•The product in question is essential to national security and
imports threaten the availability of sufficient supply of that
product to meet national security needs, or
•Imports of the product threaten a domestic industry
sufficiently to endanger the economic welfare of the country. 38

Until the Trump Administration, all Section 232 determinations
have turned on the first of these two criteria—namely, whether
imports threaten adequate supply to meet national security needs
(considered to mean defense needs). 39 Applying that standard, import
restrictions were ordered in only four cases. 40 Three were petroleum
cases generally regarded as sui generis, 41 and the fourth was a
machine tool case in which the major exporting country agreed to
voluntary export restraints. 42 In all other cases, including a steel
sector case in 2001, it was determined that, despite increasing imports
and injury caused to U.S. producers by those imports, there was no
threat to the adequacy of supply available to meet U.S. defense
requirements. 43 In several cases, supply was found to be adequate on
the basis of availability from “safe and reliable” foreign countries even
if U.S. producers might not be able to supply adequate quantities.44
37.

Trade Expansion Act of 1962 §232, 19 U.S.C. §1862 (1964).

38.

Id.

39.

See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS:
OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3–4 (2018) (describing the Section 232
investigations to date).

40.

Id. at 3.

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 4.

43.

Id.

44.

See McLARTY UPDATE: Section 232 Aluminum/Steel Investigation
Department of Commerce (DOC) Report Released, MCLARTY ASSOCIATES
(Feb.
16,
2018),
https://maglobal.com/mclarty-update-section-232aluminum-steel-investigation-department-commerce-doc-report-released/
[https://perma.cc/GP2A-BAFC] (describing the exclusion of “safe” foreign
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And in the 2001 Section 232 steel case—the last case before the
Trump Administration—Commerce stated explicitly that the issue of
whether imports threatened the health of the domestic industry was
“beyond the scope” of the Department’s inquiry. 45
The Trump Administration, only a few months after taking office,
launched Section 232 proceedings on steel and aluminum imports.46
Neither industry had petitioned for or even considered Section 232
relief. 47 The steel producers and their workers had supported Mr.
Trump in the election 48 and, in so doing, had advocated a global
limitation on steel imports. However, on the day they were summoned
to the White House, they expected to be told that a safeguard
proceeding would be initiated under Section 201. 49 To their great
surprise, they were told that Section 232 proceedings would be
initiated concerning imports of steel and aluminum. 50
After conducting investigations sufficient in its view to satisfy the
vague procedural requirements of Section 232, the Department of
Commerce found, as to both steel and aluminum, that imports
threatened to impair the security of the United States. 51 The
Department then recommended that the President impose substantial
tariffs to “adjust” imports sufficiently to permit both U.S. industries
to increase their levels of capacity utilization—in the case of steel, to
countries from section 232 investigations); Andy Home, RPT-COLUMNWhich Sledgehammer Will Trump Use on U.S. Aluminium Imports?,
REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trade-steelaluminium-ahome/rpt-column-which-sledgehammer-will-trump-use-on-usaluminium-imports-andy-home-idUSL8N1QA5NF [perma.cc/VS6N-BNJL]
(describing the exclusion of “reliable supplier” foreign nations from section
232 investigations).
45.

The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi-Finished Steel On the National
Security, U.S. Dᴇᴘᴀʀᴛᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴏfꜰ Cᴏᴍᴍᴇʀᴄᴇ Bᴜʀᴇᴀᴜ ᴏfꜰ Exᴘᴏʀᴛ
Aᴅᴍɪɴɪsᴛʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ 37 (2001).

46.

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 39, at 5.

47.

Id.

48.

See Nick Carey, Trump Steel Tariffs May Leave These U.S. Steelworkers
Jobless, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2018, 4:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-trade-steel-jobs/trump-steel-tariffs-may-leave-these-u-ssteelworkers-jobless-idUSKCN1GL2V9
[https://perma.cc/8H85-UXEL]
(describing the impact on President Trump’s steel tariffs).

49.

See Chad Brown, Trump’s Long-awaited Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are
Just the Beginning, PIIE (Mar. 26, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://piie.com
/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-long-awaited-steel-andaluminum-tariffs-are-just [https://perma.cc/M8UR-D4B7] (indicating that
the tariffs were not what the steelworkers who voted for Trump were
expecting).

50.

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 39, at 5.

51.

Id. at 6.
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80 percent. 52 In making these determinations, Commerce ignored past
Section 232 precedent and did not consider whether imports
threatened the adequacy of supply available for defense needs. 53 Such
a standard would clearly not have justified an affirmative
determination, since only small percentages of U.S. steel and
aluminum production (three percent in the case of steel) are used for
defense purposes. 54 Instead, Commerce determined that imports
jeopardized the health of the domestic industry and thus, threatened
U.S. economic welfare. 55 One might question that conclusion, at least
as to the steel industry, which was enjoying strong operating results
and had subjected the majority of imports to antidumping and
countervailing duty orders. 56 But of course, these determinations
were not appealable. 57
President Trump ordered that imports be “adjusted” by
imposition of twenty-five percent tariffs on steel (slightly higher than
Commerce had recommended) and ten percent on aluminum. 58 As to
certain countries (including Canada, Mexico, Korea, Brazil,
Argentina, Australia and the European Union), however, the
President suspended imposition of those tariffs to permit those
countries to negotiate alternative means of removing the threat to
U.S. national security. 59 This was done for the stated reason that
those countries are security allies of the United States. 60
Based on the foregoing, one may certainly conclude that these
cases had little to do with either national security or, at least in the
52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at 7.

55.

Id. at 6.

56.

See DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DUTY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES: FY 2016,
FISCAL YEAR 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS, 21–30 (2017) (outlining imports
from antidumping and countervailing duty cases).

57.

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 39.

58.

Johnathan Swan, Trump Declares his Trade War: Targets Steel,
Aluminum, AXIOS (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-declareshis-trade-war-targets-steel-aluminum-2f68d5fe-69ec-4872-b1d5aaae28f7bf4b.html [https://perma.cc/5K9J-JMLW].

59.

Lesley Wroughton, Trump Temporarily Excludes EU, Six Other Allies from
Steel Tariffs, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-trade-steel/trump-temporarily-excludes-eu-six-other-alliesfrom-steel-tariffs-idUSKBN1GZ0ET [https://perma.cc/PS3A-FXRQ].
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case of steel, with serious threat to the viability of the U.S.
While the “adjustment” of imports definitely benefited both
industries, largely in the form of increased market prices, 61
clear that the Trump Administration used the Section 232
its trade negotiations with several nations.
A.

industry.
domestic
it is also
tariffs in

Canada and Mexico

The steel and aluminum tariffs—along with the subsequent threat
of Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts—became a significant
bargaining tool in the renegotiation of NAFTA. 62 This is discussed in
Section V of this paper.
B.

The European Union

The EU strongly protested the steel and aluminum tariffs,63
challenged them in the WTO, 64 implemented retaliatory tariffs65
(justified by the interesting argument that the tariffs were in fact not
national security measures, but were instead safeguard measures,
which give rise to a claim for compensation under WTO rates), and
initially insisted that it would not negotiate until and unless the EU
were permanently and unconditionally exempted from any Section 232
steel and aluminum measures. 66 But this position changed when the
Trump Administration initiated a Section 232 proceeding on autos
and auto parts, implicating a much larger volume of trade and posing
a far larger economic threat to EU Member States, especially
61.

Chris Isidore, US Steel a Big Winner After Tariffs Boost Prices, CNN
MONEY
(Aug.
2,
2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/02/news/companies/us-steel-earningstariffs/index.html [https://perma.cc/M8KU-CCAV].

62.

Andrew Mayeda et al., Trump Turns Steel Tariffs into NAFTA Bargaining
Chip, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2018-03-06/steel-tariffs-transform-into-nafta-chip-as-trumpplays-dealmaker [https://perma.cc/8G4A-Z4KN].

63.

See US Tariffs a Dangerous Game, Says EU, BBC (June 1, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44324565
[https://perma.cc/J4RCVEVW].

64.

DS548: United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium
Products, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english
/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds548_e.htm [https://perma.cc/E9W8-YDDA]
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Union, United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/1 (June 6, 2018).
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Germany. 67 At that point, an EU delegation hurried to Washington,
offering increased purchases of U.S. products and a free trade
negotiation covering most trade in goods, regulatory cooperation, and
some services trade issues. 68 The U.S. agreed to enter the trade
negotiation and to refrain from any new tariffs on imports from the
EU (i.e., deferral of Section 232 auto tariffs) pending the trade
negotiation. 69 But the steel and aluminum tariffs remain in effect.70
This means that, despite its repeated statements that it would not
negotiate “with a gun to its head,” 71 the EU is now negotiating with a
United States that enjoys two major forms of tariff-based leverage—
the ability to lift the steel and aluminum tariffs in response to EU
negotiating concessions and the threat of imposing auto tariffs if the
EU does not agree to U.S. negotiating demands.
C. South Korea

Here the U.S. used concessions to Korea in trade negotiations to
achieve an agreement on steel and aluminum tariffs that the U.S.
badly needed as a precedent for its Section 232 exemption
negotiations with other nations. 72 As noted earlier, Candidate Trump
repeatedly derided the KORUS FTA as one of the worst trade deals
ever negotiated. 73 Accordingly, one of the first tasks assigned to new
USTR Lighthizer was to renegotiate KORUS to eliminate the U.S.
67.

German Carmakers Dismayed as US Considers Imposing Auto Tariffs, THE
LOCAL (May 24, 2018), https://www.thelocal.de/20180524/germancarmakers-dismayed-as-us-weighs-auto-tariffs
[https://perma.cc/8Q7ECQMS].

68.

See Mark Landler & Ana Swanson, U.S. and Europe Outline Deal to Ease
Trade Feud, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/07/25/us/politics/trump-europe-trade.html [https://perma.cc/GN88JN4Z] (explaining events unfolding during negotiations).

69.
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Ross, SPUTNIK NEWS (July 26, 2018), https://sputniknews.com
/world/201807261066715394-us-tariffs-eu-ross/
[https://perma.cc/KY8U2JYN].
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Daniel Boffey, Trump-Junker ‘Talks About Talks’ Met With Skepticism,
GUARDIAN (July 26, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business
/2018/jul/26/jean-claude-juncker-donald-trump-trade-deal-washingtontalks-analysis [https://perma.cc/LQ4Y-CMSS].
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trade deficit to Korea. 74 Negotiations were commenced, which became
a major political problem for the South Korean government at a time
when it was important for the two countries to avoid conflicts that
could interfere with their united effort to negotiate with North
Korea. 75 And Ambassador Lighthizer quickly became convinced that
no KORUS renegotiation could significantly improve the trade deficit
unless it included Korean concessions in areas—such as rice trade—
that both sides understood were non-negotiable. 76 Yet the President
and Administration protectionists were threatening to walk away
from KORUS if they could not announce some sort of success in the
FTA renegotiation. 77
The solution to Ambassador Lighthizer’s problem took the form
of a deal to conclude the KORUS renegotiation with essentially
cosmetic agreement changes in return for Korea agreeing to something
the U.S. badly needed in connection with the Section 232 steel and
aluminum measures. 78 When the U.S. invited countries to seek
exemption for the Section 232 tariffs, it conditioned the granting of
such exemptions on a country’s agreement to implement alternative
measures that would remove the threat posed to U.S. security by
imports from that country. 79 USTR needed to make it clear that such
an “alternative measure” would have to include a sharp reduction in
that country’s volume of steel and aluminum exports to the United
States. And for that reason, USTR offered to conclude the KORUS
74.

The White House, Briefing Statement, President Donald J. Trump is
Fulfilling His Promise on the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement
and on National Security (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-fulfilling-promise-unitedstates-korea-free-trade-agreement-national-security/ [https://perma.cc/7H35
-39HS].

75.
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Deal Ahead of North Korea Denuclearization Summit, JAPAN TIMES (Mar.
30, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/30/asia-pacific/
politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/seoul-raced-conclude-u-s-trade-deal-aheadnorth-korea-denuclearization-summit/#.XFSO3i2ZM1I
[https://perma.cc/JU5R-FHKE].
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See John Brinkley, U.S. – S. Korea Trade Pact Revision is Full of Holes,
FORBES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley
/2018/03/27/us-korea-fta-revision-is-full-of-holes/#300b3b8420a3 [https://
perma.cc/ERH3-NV24] (discussing the issues with the Korean trade
renegotiation).

77.
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renegotiation with two auto-related changes (that sounded good but
were entirely cosmetic) 80 if Korea would agree, as a condition of
exempting its steel exports from the Section 232 tariffs, to reduce the
volume of its steel exports to an annual level 30 percent below the
2015-17 average. 81
Korea agreed to that deal, 82 which shows that leverage can work
in both directions when unilateral import restrictions are imposed or
threatened in parallel with trade negotiations. Here, it was the
Korean political imperative to bring the KORUS renegotiation to an
end that provided the leverage needed by the U.S. on a major issue
relating to the Section 232 tariffs.
D. Turkey

It is important to understand that the leverage provided by
unilateral import restrictions can be used as leverage for disputes that
have nothing to do with trade, provided the Administration has the
flexibility to increase or reduce the import restrictions at will. The
Trump Administration’s use of the Section 232 steel and aluminum
tariffs for leverage in a non-trade issue with Turkey demonstrates how
tariffs can become an all-purpose leverage device.
Turkey is a substantial exporter of steel to the United States.83
Initially, its exports suffered as a result of the steel tariffs. 84 However,
as U.S. steel market price levels rose, the effect of the tariffs became
less onerous on all foreign exporters, including the Turkish
producers. 85 This is what happens in a commodity market when the
same tariff is imposed on imports from all sources. 86
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This summer, however, a dispute arose over the Turkish
Government’s prosecution and imprisonment of an American pastor. 87
President Trump demanded that the pastor be released. 88 When the
Turkish government refused, President Trump ordered that the
Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from Turkey be
doubled, to fifty percent and twenty percent respectively. 89 In
contrast to the effect of a tariff applied equally to imports from all
sources, where increase in the market price can reduce or eliminate
the burden on exporters, a tariff applied only to imports from one
country hits that country’s exporters with full impact. 90
Not surprisingly, the Turkish Government released the American
pastor after the U.S. employed the Section 232 tariffs as
leverage. Successful or not, however, this case shows that the Trump
Administration regards these tariffs as potentially all-purpose leverage
devices, not just means of ensuring national security or protecting a
domestic industry.

III. Section 301 Tariffs and the US-China Trade
Conflict
Arguably the most important issue in international trade today is
how China’s “state capitalism” system can be reconciled with the
rules-based WTO system. 91
The USTR has conducted an
investigation pursuant to Section 301 and has determined that China
has acted unfairly in numerous respects. 92 These include theft and
forced transfers of U.S. companies’ intellectual property, extensive
subsidies, and restrictions on foreign firms’ ability to do business in
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China. 93 Pursuant to these findings, the United States has already
imposed tariffs on $50 billion of imports from China (in two
tranches) 94 and China has retaliated by imposing tariffs on an
equivalent volume of imports from the United States. 95 This is in
addition to China-U.S. tariffs and retaliatory tariffs earlier in the
year, growing out of the Section 232 investigations of steel and
aluminum. 96
This tariff conflict is occurring alongside efforts by both countries
to reach a negotiated resolution. 97 China has proposed on several
occasions a “resolution” in which China would reduce the bilateral
trade deficit by making quite large increases in its importation of U.S.
goods, notably natural gas and agricultural products. 98 In June,
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross agreed in principle to such a deal,99
but it was opposed by senior Administration officials—led by USTR
Lighthizer and Trade & Industrial Policy Advisor Peter Navarro—
and the Chinese proposal was ultimately rejected. 100 Those U.S.
officials, backed so far by President Trump, insist that any resolution
must focus on commitments by China to modify a broad range of
policies and practices that the United States considers not only unfair,
93.

Id.

94.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release, USTR Issues Tariffs
on Chinese Products in Response to Unfair Trade Practices (June 15, 2018),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2018/june/ustr-issues-tariffs-chinese-products
[https://perma.cc/PT8X-DL7Q].

95.

Charles Riley, China to Put 25% Tariffs on $16 Billion Worth of US
MONEY
(Aug.
8,
2018,
10:19
AM
ET),
Products,
CNN
https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/08/news/economy/china-tariffs-ustrade/index.html [https://perma.cc/AP7E-LFLS].

96.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Additional Duty on Imports of Steel
and Aluminum Articles under Section 232 (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/entry-summary/232tariffs-aluminum-and-steel [https://perma.cc/LJ9M-DMX9].

97.

Berkeley Lovelace Jr., US Hits China’s ZTE with $1 Billion Penalty in Deal
to End Crippling Sanctions, Commerce Secretary Ross Says, CNBC (June
7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/07/commerce-secretary-wilburross-the-us-strikes-a-deal-with-zte.html [https://perma.cc/94DP-SUJD].

98.

Se Young Lee & Christian Shepherd, China Plans Tariffs on $60 Billion of
U.S. Goods in Latest Trade Salvo, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2019 8:30 AM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-commerce/china-planstariffs-on-60-billion-of-us-goods-in-latest-trade-salvo-idUSKBN1KO1M2
[https://perma.cc/8RNT-ZFUD].

99.

Lovelace, supra note 97.

100. Ana Swanson, Trump’s Trade War Spooks Markets as White House Waits
for
China
to
Blink,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/business/china-trade-war-peternavarro.html [https://perma.cc/EY2R-38RE].

64

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Leverage is Everything

but seriously disruptive of trade and injurious to the U.S. economy,
including:
•requiring, as a condition of establishing operations in China,
that a foreign company enter a joint venture with a Chinese
competitor and transfer proprietary technology to that joint
venture;
•theft, by “hacking” and otherwise, of U.S. firms’ intellectual
property;
•maintaining market-disrupting overcapacity in steel and
aluminum, with overcapacity in semiconductors scheduled to
come on-stream soon;
•control by state-owned enterprises of China’s industrial assets,
together with state ownership or control of some of the world’s
largest banks;
•the “Made in China 2025” project, in which massive subsidies
will be provided for the development (including technology
development) of selected industries including semiconductors,
aircraft, new energy vehicles and biotech; and
•control of data flows by requiring storage of data in China and
by forbidding foreign companies to set up their own data
centers in China. 101

China has largely refused to negotiate on these issues, denying
some of the allegations and taking the position as to others that, since
China insists that it is still a developing country, that this status
permits China to engage in these practices. 102
After failure in August of the latest set of China negotiations,
President Trump announced the intention to apply tariffs to an
additional $200 billion in Chinese imports. 103 And he has intimated
that he would consider tariffs on an additional $267 billion in

101. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 96.
102. Simon Lester & Huan Zao, Is China Still a ‘Developing Nation’. Here’s the
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103. Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, The US-China Trade War: A
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imports. 104 That would place tariffs on essentially all of China’s
exports to the United States. 105
This accelerating trade war takes the Trump Administration’s
leverage strategy to what could be its ultimate test. China shows no
sign of abandoning or ameliorating policies that it sees as essential to
its rightful economic development. Moreover, the use of tariffs to
enforce Section 301 determination is flatly WTO-inconsistent. 106 The
USTR argument—that most of these Chinese practices are not
specifically covered by WTO disciplines and “therefore” unilateral
tariffs are a permissible remedy 107—does not, in the view of this
writer, pass the “laugh test.” The point is that the U.S. is imposing
tariffs in excess of its WTO-bound limits, without any WTO
authority for so doing. 108
This is, of course, a difficult issue. There is validity in the U.S.
concerns that China’s practices are disruptive of trade and injurious
to the United States, and that these practices are fundamentally
inconsistent with the rules-based trading system. But it is also true
that the U.S. response is WTO-inconsistent.
This is the
quintessential example of a dispute that should be settled by
negotiation. But there seems to be no willingness on China’s part to
engage on these “structural” issues 109 and that is why the United
States seems intent on continuing to ratchet up the leverage.

IV. U.S. Desire to Renegotiate the WTO Agreement
The World Trade Organization, the central authority in the rulesbased trading system, was in large part the creation of U.S. trade
policy. 110 In particular, it was the United States that orchestrated (in
the Uruguay Round) the creation of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism
(DSM) that would apply the general language of the WTO
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105. Id.
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Agreements to specific disputes and whose rulings could not be vetoed
by the losing WTO Member. 111
Today, the Trump Administration—both U.S. Trade
Representative Lighthizer and the President himself—questions
whether the WTO serves America’s interests, 112 objects in particular
to the DSM, 113 and has gone so far as to threaten U.S. withdrawal
from the WTO. 114 The Administration’s concerns focus primarily on
what it perceives as three fundamental problem areas:
1.The difficulty in applying WTO rules to China’s “strategic
capitalism” 115 (or, as USTR describes it in the President’s 2018
Trade Policy Agenda, “the extensive distortions in China’s
economy”). 116
2.The divide that has progressively widened between the
developed countries that originally founded the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and developing
countries—now the great majority of WTO Members—who see
trade liberalization as secondary to those countries’ policies to
promote their economic development. 117 This split has been
largely responsible for repeated stalemates in multilateral and
plurilateral trade negotiations. 118 And it raises serious and
difficult questions when some developing countries—China,
India and Brazil come to mind—evolve into major trading
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nations yet continue to claim the “special and differential
treatment” accorded by WTO rules to developing countries. 119
The extent to which the DSM, in interpreting how the general
rules set forth in the antidumping, countervailing duty, and
safeguard agreements should be applied to specific facts, has
frequently found U.S. trade remedy practices to be WTOinconsistent (although the United States has won the vast
majority of WTO challenges it has brought against other
countries’ practices). 120

The Administration has embarked on a serious “commit[ment] to
reform[] the global trading system in ways that lead to fairer
outcomes for U.S. workers and businesses…” 121 and to “press for
significant reform of the WTO.” 122 While all of the foregoing concerns
are implicated in that effort, a specific focus, and the one as to which
the Administration is employing the leverage tactics discussed in this
paper, is a multi-faceted “reform” of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. The U.S. contends that:
•The application of Agreement rules to specific facts in ways
that the U.S. believes do not “adhere[] strictly to the text of
those agreements, as negotiated and agreed by its Members.” 123
The 2018 Trade Policy Agenda complains that “Concerns
abound that dispute reports have added to or diminished rights
or obligations in varied areas, such as subsidies, antidumping
duties, and countervailing duties….” 124
•The rendering of “as such” rulings, which find that a country’s
on-going rule or practice, not just the outcome of a particular
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case, is a WTO violation. 125 In the U.S. view, “The purpose of
the dispute settlement system is not to produce reports or to
‘make law,’ but rather to help Members resolve trade disputes
among them.” 126
•“[T]he Appellate Body’s review of the meaning of a Member’s
domestic law that is being challenged,” 127 and
•The Appellate Body’s position that “its reports effectively
serve as precedent and that panels are to follow prior Appellate
Body reports absent ‘cogent reasons.’” 128

These concerns clearly arise from a multiplicity of DSM rulings
against U.S. practices in trade remedy (antidumping, countervailing
duty, and safeguard) cases.
In the U.S. view, “the WTO is
undermining our country’s ability to act in its national interest.”129
But “reforming” the DSM to “correct” these aspects of its current
practice would be truly radical. It would in many ways take the
system back to the very limited role it played in the GATT era and
negate the very changes that the U.S. brought about in the formation
of the World Trade Organization.
In seeking such “reform” of the DSM, the United States is using
leverage in ways similar to the practices discussed earlier in this
paper.
First, as noted earlier, President Trump has threatened to
withdraw the U.S. from the WTO if U.S. demands are not met.130
One must wonder, however, whether this withdrawal threat has much
credibility. U.S. departure from the WTO would have massively
severe adverse consequences for our country, such as:
•Countries could raise tariffs on U.S. goods at will;
•U.S. trade remedy duties, now permitted under the
Antidumping, ASCM, and Safeguard Agreements, could be met
with retaliatory tariffs;
•DSM challenges of foreign countries’ access barriers and other
unfair practices, of which the U.S. has won the vast majority
that it has brought, would no longer be available; and

125. See id. at 172-9 (discussing “as such” opinions).
126. Id. at 26.
127. Id. at 27.
128. Id. at 28.
129. Id.
130. Micklethwait et al., supra note 14.
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•The U.S. could no longer participate in WTO multilateral or
plurilateral negotiations to establish the rules of world trade.

Moreover, for all of these reasons, it seems inconceivable that the
U.S. Congress would permit a U.S. withdrawal from the WTO.
But the U.S. has found another, much more effective, leverage
procedure. Throughout the Trump Administration, the U.S. has
exercised its right to block the appointment of new Appellate Body
members to fill seats vacated by retirement, departure, or expiration
of term. 131 We have now reached the point where there are only three
Appellate Body members remaining. 132 Since each appeal to the
Appellate Body must be heard by three members, 133 the departure of
one more member—which will happen in December of 2019—and the
U.S.’s refusal to allow a replacement will bring the Dispute
Settlement Mechanism to a halt.
The WTO Membership is acutely aware of the impending crisis
created by this U.S. leverage device. 134 Groups of Members have
organized to explore ways to promote a compromise. 135 In a littlerecognized part of the U.S.-EU modus vivendi reached this summer to
defer the U.S. threat of auto Section 232 tariffs, the EU agreed to
work with the U.S. to resolve U.S. concerns about the WTO. 136
It seems to this writer—and I say this with great concern—that
the U.S. leverage strategy has a substantial likelihood of success in
effecting changes in the DSM. The WTO Membership must find a
way to appease the United States before the next Appellate Body
vacancy occurs. While an agreement to adopt ways to address China’s
“state capitalism” might well be enough to satisfy the Trump
Administration, it seems clear to me that neither the China issue nor
131. Id.
132. Jennifer Hillman et al., Three Approaches to Fixing the World Trade
Organization’s Appellate Body: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly?, Iɴsᴛ. ᴏf
Iɴᴛ’ʟ Eᴄᴏɴ. L. at 1-2 (2018).
133. Id. at 2.
134. See Tom Miles, Trump’s Bonfire of the Treaties Sweeps Towards the WTO,
(May
18,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/REUTERS
idUSKCN1IJ1K9 [https://perma.cc/JUK3-6Y2U] (describing the issues
arising from President Trump’s chokehold over the WTO).
135. See, e.g., Adam Behsudi, A Sign of Compromise at the WTO?, POLITICO
(July
18,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morningtrade/2018/07/18/a-sign-of-compromise-at-the-wto-283160
[https://perma.cc/Q4K5-66MN] (discussing a leaked EU proposal to try
and compromise with the U.S. over WTO complaints).
136. Bryce Baschuk, EU Revises Plan to Fix WTO in Bid to Get U.S. on Board,
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news
BLOOMBERG
/articles/2018-11-01/eu-is-said-to-revise-plan-to-fix-wto-in-bid-to-get-u-s-onboard [https://perma.cc/UA8X-4BYW].
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the developed/developing Member divide have any chance whatsoever
of garnering sufficient support among the WTO Membership. At this
time, therefore, that leaves DSM “reform” as the only way out.
Which, of course, would be a great pity.

V. NAFTA
It is interesting to read the indictment of NAFTA set forth in the
President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda. Almost all of the criticisms
are directed at the Mexican portion of the trilateral agreement. 137 By
far, the major concern is that NAFTA provided incentives for
“thousands of American companies” to shift production to Mexico,
where they would “pay far lower wages to workers.” 138 Canada gets a
single sentence: “NAFTA failed to address longstanding and unfair
Canadian trade practices across several industries.” 139
Accordingly, the primary U.S. negotiating goal was to “improve
the U.S. trade balance and reduce the trade deficit with the NAFTA
countries.” 140 This would be done by tightening rules of origin,
especially for autos and auto parts, increasing the requirements both
for regional content and for U.S. content, and by avoiding provisions
that encourage outsourcing. 141
As soon as the talks commenced, however, USTR put on the table
a series of additional demands that provoked outrage in both Mexico
and Canada, including:
•A “sunset” provision, under which NAFTA would have to be
renewed every five years; 142
•Termination of the Chapter 19 provision that permitted U.S.
import relief decisions to be appealed to a trilateral body
instead of to domestic courts (a provision held dear by
Canada); 143
137. 2018 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 116, at 7-9.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Id. at 8.
140. Id. at 9.
141. Id.
142. David Lawder, U.S. Hikes Tensions in NAFTA Talks with Call for ‘Sunset
Clause’, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/ustrade-nafta/u-s-hikes-tensions-in-nafta-talks-with-call-for-sunset-clauseidUSKBN1CH2EO [https://perma.cc/VYW8-U6UP].
143. Riyaz Dattu et al., International Trade Brief: Trump Administration Takes
Aim at Chapter 19 of NAFTA, U.S. Wish List for NAFTA Renegotiations
and More, OSLER (Apr. 6, 2017) https://www.osler.com/en/resources/crossborder/2017/international-trade-brief-trump-administration-ta
[https://perma.cc/K7FU-99RF].
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•A requirement that automobiles and parts entering the United
States would not qualify for duty-free entry unless a certain
percentage of their content be produced by workers paid at least
$16 per hour (compared with the average daily wage in Mexico’s
auto plants of $25); 144
•Elimination or major modification of Canada’s “supply
management” regime for dairy and poultry; 145 and
•Reform of certain Canadian intellectual property rules and of
procedural rules in certain provinces hampering sales of U.S.
wines. 146

The negotiations were going nowhere by early 2018. 147 The U.S.
Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum were met with retaliatory
tariffs, 148 WTO challenges, 149 and declarations that the EU would not
“negotiate with a gun to our heads.” 150
Accordingly, the U.S. ratcheted up the leverage by announcing a
Section 232 proceeding on automobiles and auto parts, despite
opposition by U.S. auto and auto parts makers, 151 whose operations
are inextricably intertwined with their Mexican and Canadian

144. Id.
145. Alexander Panetta, U.S. Asks Canada to End Dairy, Poultry Trade
Barriers, Even As It Puts Up Its Own, CANADIAN PRESS (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://globalnews.ca/news/3806997/nafta-supply-management-dairypoultry-eggs/ [https://perma.cc/Z2BS-WEA5].
146. Id.
147. See Press Release, Office of the U. S. Trade Representative, Fact Sheets:
Closing Statement of USTR Robert Lighthizer at the Sixth Round of
NAFTA Renegotiations (Jan. 29, 2018) (mentioning the slow progress made
in round 6 of 7 negotiation rounds).
148. See generally Robert Holleyman et al., 2018 Midterm Elections Update:
Impact on U.S. Trade Policy, Cʀᴏᴡᴇʟʟ Mᴏʀɪɴɢ (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.cmtradelaw.com/category/section-232-tariffs/
[https://perma.cc/D4GW-GWEY] (listing all retaliatory actions made by
nations worldwide).
149. Members Raise Concerns over US Section 232 Investigation on Automobiles
and Automotive Parts, WTO (July 3, 2018), https://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news18_e/good_03jul18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/NZH8XQ8Z].
150. Boffey, supra note 71.
151. Ambassador Susan G. Esserman et al., Commerce Initiates Section 232
Investigation of Imports of Automobiles and Automotive Parts, Sᴛᴇᴘᴛᴏᴇ
(May 24, 2018), https://www.steptoe.com/print/content/29966/CommerceInitiates-Section-232-Investigation-of-Imports-of-Automobiles-andAutomotive-Parts.pdf?q= [https://perma.cc/4CF9-N7WT].
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operations. 152 Shortly thereafter, President Trump announced that
the United States would negotiate separately with Mexico and, if
Canada did not join later a deal done with Mexico, the Canada part
of NAFTA could be abandoned. 153 Mexico agreed, both because of
the severe threat of auto tariffs and because of a turn taken by its
domestic politics. 154
The leftist candidate, Lopez Obrador, won the election and
became President at the end of 2018. 155 He wanted the NAFTA issue
to be resolved before he assumed power. 156 And the outgoing
President, Peña Nieto, wanted the new deal done in time for him to
sign it. 157
So, as to Mexico, the combination of the leverage of threatened
tariffs and the domestic Mexican politics got a deal done. A month
later, Canada also signed what is now re-named the United StatesMexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA. 158 One must conclude that
the leverage of threatened Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts
succeeded.
There remain, however, questions as to whether Canada and
Mexico will ratify USMCA. Both countries believe they were
152. Rob Stumpf, Trump’s New Trade Deal Could Affect One in Three
Imported Vehicles From Mexico: Report, Tʜᴇ Dʀɪᴠᴇ (Aug. 29, 2018),
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[https://perma.cc/34S3K7RJ]; Jerry Edgerton, If Trump Slaps Auto Tariffs on Canada, Here’s
What You’ll Pay, CBS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com
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in Landslide, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/07/01/world/americas/mexico-election-andres-manuel-lopezobrador.html [https://perma.cc/V5GL-K2GS].
156. Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico’s New Leader, Once a Nafta Foe, Welcomes New
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/10/01/world/americas/nafta-mexico.html
[https://perma.cc/C5B5ZD7W].
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promised that, if they signed the new USMCA, they would be given
exemptions from the Section 232 tariffs on steel and
aluminum. 159 However, the United States has taken the position that
such exemptions will be granted only if Mexico and Canada agree to
quantitative limits on their steel and aluminum exports. 160 Both
Canada and Mexico have threatened not to ratify unless tariff
exemptions are granted without quantitative limitations. 161 As of this
writing, in April 2019, it is not clear how this issue will be resolved.
Very recently, President Trump has raised a new issue as to the
Section 232 tariffs on autos and auto parts. Both Canada and Mexico
are to be effectively exempted from any auto tariffs that are imposed
by a USMCA provision that will allow each country to make tarifffree shipments of quantities that exceed their current levels of exports
to the United States. 162 However, USMCA is not yet in force and
President Trump has recently threatened to place Section 232 tariffs
on Mexican autos if Mexico does not adopt sufficient measures to stop
the flow of Central American refugees to the United States and
sufficient measures to stop the flow of dangerous drugs into the
United States. 163
159. Bill Tomson, US Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Threaten Mexican, Canadian
USMCA Support, AGRI-PULSE (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.agripulse.com/articles/11903-us-tariffs-seen-holding-up-new-north-americantrade-pact (“The [232] exemptions, officials said at the time, were tied to
the negotiations to rewrite [NAFTA].”).
160. Mark O’Hara, Section 232 Tariffs Could Be a Stumbling Block in USMCA,
MARKET REALIST (Apr. 4, 2019), https://articles.marketrealist.com
/2019/04/section-232-tariffs-could-be-a-stumbling-block-inusmca/?utm_source=google (“The administration is . . . trying to impose
quotas on Canada and Mexico for granting them Section 232 exemptions.”).
161. See Josh Wingrove, Canada Won’t Ratify New Nafta Deal If Metals Tariffs
Remain in Place, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2019-04-05/canada-won-t-ratify-usmca-trade-deal-if-metalstariffs-in-place (quoting a Canadian envoy that the country “won’t move
ahead on ratification so long as the U.S. tariffs remain in place”); see also
Mike Blanchfield, Mexico Won’t Ratify New NAFTA if U.S. Keeps Tariffs
on Steel and Aluminum, FINANCIAL POST (Mar. 4, 2019), https://
business.financialpost.com/news/economy/mexico-pushing-labour-reformwont-ratify-new-nafta-with-u-s-tariffs-in-place (stating that Mexico is
“prepared to keep the status quo” with NAFTA “unless the Trump
administration lifts the punishing tariffs it has imposed on Mexican steel
and aluminum imports”).
162. Sabrina Rodriguez, Trump: China Deal Could Be Reached in Weeks,
POLITICO (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morningtrade/2019/04/05/trump-china-deal-could-be-reached-in-weeks-421870 (“. . .
[T]he three NAFTA countries signed side letters during negotiations that
largely exempt autos and auto parts from Mexico and Canada from any
potential tariffs.”).
163. See Dave Graham & David Ljunggren, New NAFTA Deal ‘in trouble,’
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74

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Leverage is Everything

What does this tell us? It provides still further confirmation that,
for the Trump Administration, threats of tariffs and other unilateral
trade measures are seen as leverage instruments, including leverage
with respect to objectives unrelated to trade.

VI. Some Concluding Thoughts
The foregoing narratives underscore the importance of considering
trade negotiations and unilateral import restrictions together in order
to understand both the nature of this Administration’s goals and the
dynamics of leverage in the negotiating process.
I would also observe that, as of April 2019, we have not yet seen
a final endgame that would show how this Administration will handle
a situation in which it actually has to exercise the leverage it has
created. For now, the U.S. has not actually withdrawn from an
existing trade agreement. TPP and TTIP were not agreements to
which the U.S. had become a party, nor were they ones as to which
the Trump Administration sought additional concessions, so there was
no use of leverage to induce some agreement by other parties. Nor
have we seen what the Administration would do if the other party
were to refuse to agree to the U.S. demands, raising the question
whether they would actually exercise the leverage they had created.
Note in this regard that President Trump, upon reaching agreement
with Mexico, initially gave Canada a one-week deadline to reach an
agreement. 164 But when that did not happen, he extended that
deadline until the end of September. 165 If Canada had not reached an
agreement by then, would the President have “pulled the trigger” and
imposed auto tariffs (Indeed, could he have done so, since the
Commerce Department had not completed its process)? Would he
have given the required 6-month notice of termination of NAFTA166
as to Canada? Could he have terminated as to one country and not
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-analysis/new-nafta-deal-introuble-bruised-by-elections-tariff-rows-idUSKCN1RJ0BS
(noting
that
President Trump has threated “to slap tariffs on Mexican auto exports
unless Mexico does more to stop drug traffickers and illegal immigrants.”).
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[https://perma.cc/XF98M6Q7].
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N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/
business/us-canada-nafta.html [https://perma.cc/J54L-DNPS].
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NAFTA. It Won’t Be Easy, CBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nafta-mexico-trade-canada-us-trump1.4802560 [https://perma.cc/3WEV-F7Z8].
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the other? Or would he have had to terminate NAFTA entirely and
re-cast the Mexico deal as a separate FTA? Finally, what will be the
result of his new threat to impose Section 232 auto tariffs on Mexico
if he is not satisfied with Mexico’s refugee and drug policies?
The China Section 301 and WTO “reform” situations also raise
complex, but immensely important questions. If no agreement is
reached with China, will the Administration keep increasing the
amount of Chinese imports on which tariffs are imposed? And what is
the ultimate end game if, as I believe likely, China proves unwilling to
negotiate some of the structural reforms demanded by the United
States?
The WTO situation is even more complex, although the
timeframe is more extended. The ultimate question is whether the
United States is truly willing to bring the WTO dispute settlement
system to a halt just to avoid meaningful WTO review of U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty decisions? Would it insist on
something more, like better rules disciplining Chinese practices?
Could such better rules be obtained? Would the WTO Membership
simply refuse to accede to U.S. demands on any of these issues? Might
the WTO find a way to appoint new Appellate Body members over
U.S. objections? These are indeed big questions, and one lesson I draw
is that, before establishing something that gives your country
leverage, it is important to game plan for whether and how you might
have to exercise that leverage. I do not see evidence that the Trump
Administration has done that.

76

